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Abstract
Purchasing life insurance is for the welfare of young children, par-
ticularly preteens, who are liquidity constrained. In this paper, we
present a life cycle model of life insurance that takes into account the
ages of these young beneciaries. We show that, as the child ages,
the need for protection is reduced and, consequently, the size of
contingent bequest may shrink. The demand for life insurance is
positively related to the number, age differentials, living standards,
and the time needed to reach adulthood. Also, the breadwinner's life-
time uncertainty and the unfairness of the insurance market
encourage precautionary saving
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According to Belth (1985), life insurance purchase depends on how much and
how long the needs of the bene¯ciary are. Young children, particularly preteens,
who are liquidity constrained certainly need the breadwinner's support until they
reach independence. We argue that a major factor in purchasing life insurance
is the welfare of these young dependents. In this paper, we present a life cycle
model of life insurance purchase that re°ects this need.
The standard model of the demand for life insurance, e.g. Fischer (1973),
assumes that the breadwinner maximizes his expected utility over an uncertain
lifetime by choosing the level of consumption and life insurance.1 The demand for
life insurance thus obtained is dictated by the bequest function. Shorrocks (1979)
pointed out that such a model is unsatisfactory because, among other things,
the purchase of insurance is independent of the number or the circumstances of
the bene¯ciaries. Subsequently, Lewis (1989) presented a model of the demand
for life insurance that maximizes the bene¯ciary's utility, not the breadwinner's
own utility. He argued that such an approach simulates the actual calculation of
household insurance purchase. We contend that life insurance purchase should be
a choice variable of a utility maximizing breadwinner who has the bene¯ciaries'
best interest in mind.
1The emphasis in Fischer is comparative statics. Other theoretical works in the area include,
for example, Richard (1975), Campbell (1980), Pissarides (1980), and Karni and Zilcha (1985).
Richard extended Merton's (1971) consumption and portfolio rules to include life insurance.
Campbell used the technique of stochastic calculus to derive an explicit demand for life insurance
function. Pissarides studied the age-bequest (with life insurance) relationship. Karni and Zilcha
studied life insurance and the measures of risk aversion within a state-dependent framework.
Also see Borch (1991) for the institutional development of life insurance.Recall that in Fischer's model, if the breadwinner lives, he chooses his own
consumption and nothing for his bene¯ciaries. If, however, the breadwinner dies,
the bene¯ciary receives the contingent bequest (savings plus the net value of life
insurance). The departure of our model from Fischer's is that we assume the
breadwinner is altruistic towards his dependents while he is alive, not just after
his death. To accomplish this, we include the recipient's utility function up to
the \age of independence" in the breadwinner's optimization problem. Then, the
age pro¯les of income transfer, contingent bequest, and the breadwinner's own
consumption are jointly determined in the model. In contrast, Lewis approached
the problem by treating the breadwinner's consumption and income transfer as
given. Our model enables us to address the problem of life insurance purchase by
itself or as a component of intergenerational transfer.
The literature of intergenerational transfer,2 which emphasizes the interaction
between generations, typically include the bene¯ciary's income and other strategic
actions in the model. Because these models apply mainly to adult o®spring, they
often have to exclude young children in the analysis. For example, in testing the
altruistic theory, Wilhelm (1996) excluded children under age 25. Laitner and
Juster (1996, p.895) recognized this point and presented a three-period model in
which the middle period is a time of giving (to young o®spring). Our model goes
even further to study the issues arising from the ages of the young dependents.
In this sense the proposed model emphasizes those \missing" years and hence
complements the literature of intergenerational transfer.
2There is a debate on whether intergenerational transfer is derived from altruism or self-
interest. See, for example, Becker (1974, 1981), Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers(1985), Cox
(1987), Gale and Scholz (1994), Wilhelm (1996), Laitner and Juster (1996), and Altonji, Hayashi
and Kotliko® (1997). Most of these models are cast in an overlapping generation framework.
2The proposed model adds new results to the life cycle theory. We show that
there is precautionary saving arising from the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty,
when there are dependent children in the family. This precautionary saving rises
with the breadwinner's hazard rate and the loading factor of the insurance mar-
ket. The key to this result is that the Euler equation governing the breadwinner's
consumption is discounted by the actuarial rate of interest,n o tt h em a r k e ti n -
terest rate. If the actuarial rate is greater than the subjective discount rate,
then consumption rises with age. The presence of the loading factor in the Euler
equation implies an additional rate of growth of consumption compared to the
standard life cycle model. We work out a numerical example, using a CDC's Life
Table, to illustrate the signi¯cance of this delayed consumption e®ect. The theory
also predicts that an across-the-board increase in the loading factor produces an
upward tilt to the consumption pro¯le, i.e., as the insurance market becomes less
fair, more precautionary saving is encouraged.
The inclusion of the bene¯ciary's utility function in the objective function
enables us to draw implications on the income transfer to young children. We
show that the income transfer rises as the child ages and that the magnitude of
the aggregate income transfer is signi¯cantly in°uenced by the number of chil-
dren. In particular, the age pro¯le of the aggregate income transfer tends to peak
just before the oldest child reaches independence. These results support Espen-
shade's (1984) ¯ndings that older children are more expensive because, among
other things, they are physically larger and have more activities. Our results
are attributed to the breadwinner's altruism and lifetime uncertainty, and thus
provide additional explanations for these observations.
3The implication on the age pro¯le of bequests is of particular interest. Unlike
other pro¯les, the age pro¯le of bequest is not necessarily rising over time even
if the marginal utility of bequest is declining with age. This is because, in our
model, life insurance purchase is to maintain the bene¯ciary's standard of living
until his age of independence in the event of the breadwinner's untimely death.
Such a need for protection declines as the child ages. If this age factor is the
dominant factor, then the size of the bequest shrinks as the child grows up. We
show that this is indeed the case if the bene¯ciary's utility function is isoelastic.
We also show that the birth order matters. When there are multiple chil-
dren, the younger child would inherit a larger bequest. In contrast, the theory
of primogeniture predicts the opposite allocation of resources. These results are
not contradictory to each other because primogeniture applies mainly to adult
heirs. Our birth-order result is derived from the fact that the breadwinner pro-
vides equal protection for all children up to their respective ages of independence.
Since the model assumes away child mortality, the younger one has a longer way
to go before reaching independence and, therefore, needs more protection. Along
this line of reasoning, the theory predicts that the breadwinner would provide
handicapped children a longer period of income transfer if he lives, and leave a
larger bequest if he dies, since handicapped children need more protection.
Finally, we derive a closed-form demand for life insurance if the utility function
is isoelastic. We show that the demand for life insurance is negatively related to
the loading factor and savings, but is positively related to the bene¯ciary's risk
aversion { all of these are quite intuitive. More importantly, we show that the
demand for life insurance is positively related to the number, the age di®eren-
4tials, and the living standards of the bene¯ciaries. Shorrocks's criticisms are thus
addressed.
2. The Model
We ¯rst present Fischer's (1973) celebrated model with a minor change in timing.
Let T be the maximal period that the breadwinner can live. Throughout the
paper, the only source of uncertainty is the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty.
Let pt be the conditional probability that the breadwinner dies at the beginning
of period t · T; given survival to period t ¡ 1: By de¯nition, pT+1 =1 : The
decision to purchase life insurance is made at the end of period t ¡ 1; or the
beginning of period t before the true state of nature is revealed. We make this
change in timing so that when we present our model the insurance decision would
resemble that of a static insurance problem.
The revelation of the true state of nature over time is described by an event
tree. If the breadwinner lives through period t ¡ 1, then he accumulates wealth
wt for period t from which he spends a portion of his wealth, ktwt,t h ei n s u r a n c e
premium, to purchase term life insurance with face value qtktwt; where 1=qt is
the price of insurance. In short, the breadwinner enters period t with wealth
(1 ¡ kt)wt. If the breadwinner did not die at the beginning of period t,t h e nh e
chooses consumption ct for himself and accumulates wt+1 =( 1+r)[(1¡ kt)wt ¡ ct]
for period t + 1. If he died, he left behind (1 ¡ kt)wt +qtktwt to his heirs. Then,
the breadwinner solves the following recursive problem
Jt =m a x
ct;kt
f(1 ¡ pt)[ut (ct)+¯Jt+1]+ptBt [(1 ¡ kt)wt + qtktwt]g;
5where ut is the utility function, ¯ is the discount factor, Jt is the current value
of the discounted expected utility function at the beginning of period t,a n dBt
is the bequest function. Since kT =0a n dJT+1 = 0, the problem is solved by
backward induction.
The departure from Fischer's model is that we shall include the recipient's
utility in the breadwinner's decision problem. For the purpose of exposition, we
begin with only one dependent. In this context, the initial period is regarded
as the bene¯ciary's year of birth. Then, the bene¯ciary's consumption becomes
one of the breadwinner's choice variables. This inclusion is made for two reasons.
First, many dependents live primarily on the breadwinner's support until they
reach independence. We shall call T the bene¯ciary's age of independence,3 if he
reaches independence at the beginning of period T +1; with T<T. Second, since
life insurance purchase depends on how long the needs of the bene¯ciary are,
we include the bene¯ciary's utility function in the breadwinner's optimization
problem only up to period T, the age of independence.
Again, we consider only term life insurance that has no cash value and therefore
no savings component. Let the degree of unfairness of the insurance market be
summarized by `t (`t ¸ 1); the loading factor of period t.S i n c e`tpt is the price
of life insurance (i.e., the price paid for one dollar coverage of life insurance), the
insurance premium for face value ft ¸ 0i s`tptft:
If the breadwinner died in the beginning of period t, the bene¯ciary would
receive an asset, wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft; that is composed of savings, wt ¡ `tptft; and
3In the United States, child support was emphasized in the Family Support Act of 1988,
which stipulates that the wages of an absent parent shall be subject to withholding. Altruistic
or not, raising one's dependent children to a certain age seems to be the social norm. I owe this
legal reference to Bob Michael.
6the face value of life insurance, ft. This is Kotliko®'s (1989) \contingent bequest."
As we shall see later, another departure from Fischer's model is the speci¯cation
of the bequest function Bt [wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft]: Since the purchase of life insurance
is based on the needs of helping the child reach independence, we assume that the
bene¯ciary (or the guardian) will use this bequest optimally to achieve that goal.
On the other hand, if the breadwinner lived through period t,t h e nh ew o u l d
earn income yt (exogenously given) and choose consumption ct for himself and
transfer gt ¡ `tptft ¸ 0 to the bene¯ciary, where gt represents gifts inter vivos.
Notice that we make insurance premium `tptft a component of gifts inter vivos
so that the insurance purchase viewed from the bene¯ciary's perspective would
resemble that in the static model. More precisely, the demand for insurance can
be derived from comparing the income of the good state, gt ¡ `tptft; to that of
the bad state, wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft. Such an advantage would be lost if we put the
insurance premium in the budget equation.
For simplicity, we assume that there is no human capital investment in the
model, even though part of the income transfer may be used for dependent's
education. Then the budget equation is
wt+1 =( 1+r)(wt + yt ¡ ct ¡ gt); (2.1)
given the initial wealth, w0: Let the bene¯ciary's utility function be vt (¢). As
usual, ut (¢), Bt (¢)a n dvt (¢) are assumed strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Then, for t · T, the breadwinner solves the recursive problem
Jt =m a x
ct;ft;gt
(
(1 ¡ pt)[ut (ct)+vt (gt ¡ `tptft)+¯Jt+1]
+ptBt (wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft)
)
; (2.2)
subject to (2:1): For t ¸ T +1 ; Fischer's formulation applies.
7Assuming interior solutions, the ¯rst order conditions for (2:2) are, for t · T;
ptB
0
t [wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft]
(1 ¡ pt)v
0














(It should be noted that u
0
t (ct)=¯ (1 + r)@Jt+1=@wt+1 is valid for all t · T).
Condition (2:3) says that, in any period, the marginal rate of substitution between
the two states is equal to the relative price of insurance. Equation (2:4), on the
other hand, says that the marginal utility of current consumption (or that of
income transfer) is equal to the discounted expected marginal utility of future
income. In short, equation (2:3) is the optimal condition across states, while
equation (2:4) is the optimal condition across time.
An immediate corollary is that
B
0
t [wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft]=
"





t (gt ¡ `tptft): (2.5)
It follows that the contingent bequest, wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft; is positively related to
the bene¯ciary's consumption level when the breadwinner is alive, gt ¡ `tptft.A s
such, the purchase of life insurance is to guarantee the bene¯ciary's standard of
living as claimed.
A remark on the model is in order. While it bears some resemblance to Lewis's
(1989) model, there is a fundamental di®erence in modeling. To see this, we set
¯ = 1 and convert the breadwinner's problem into a two-stage maximization
problem. In the ¯rst stage, the breadwinner maximizes (2:2) for a given fftg:
Let fc¤
tg and fg¤
tg be the corresponding optimal solutions. The second stage



















t + yt ¡ c¤
t ¡ g¤
t)b yc h o o s i n gfftg. Then the purchase
of life insurance is indeed to maximize the bene¯ciary's utility from birth to age
T, as contended by Lewis. The di®erence, however, is that the breadwinner's
consumption, fc¤
tg; and gifts to the dependents, fgg
¤
t ; are not exogenously given
as assumed in Lewis, but functions of ft:
3. Precautionary Saving and Income Transfer
To study the age pro¯les of the breadwinner's consumption and income transfer,






















t (gt ¡ `tptft): (3.2)
If the insurance market is actuarially fair, then (3:1) is reduced to u
0
t¡1 (ct¡1)=
¯ (1 + r)u
0
t (ct); which is standard in the life cycle theory. See, for example, Tobin
(1967). Similarly, (3:2) becomes v
0
t¡1 (gt¡1 ¡ pt¡1ft¡1)=¯ (1 + r)v
0
t (gt ¡ ptft):
Recall that ¯ stands for the time preference derived from factors other than
lifetime uncertainty. Then, the subjective discount factor is ¯ (1 ¡ pt). By ignoring
r`tp (a small number) and the higher order terms of pt; we have
1+r
1 ¡ `tpt
¼ 1+r + `tpt:
9Since `tpt is the price of life insurance, r+`tpt is the actuarial rate of interest. In
other words, with the purchase of life insurance, the proper discount rate is not
the market interest rate, but the actuarial rate of interest. This is standard in
uncertain lifetime literature. See, for example, Chang (1991).
The presence of the loading factor in the Euler equations is a new result. It
has an interesting implication on the breadwinner's consumption pro¯le. Under





¸ 1; for all t · T,t h ea g e
pro¯le of consumption of the breadwinner is upward sloping. In other words, if
the preference is stable over time and the actuarial rate of interest is greater than
or equal to the subjective discount rate (i.e., r+`tpt ¸ ½+pt,w h e r e1+½ =1 =¯),
then there is delayed consumption. More importantly, an increase in the loading
factor, and hence an increase in the actuarial rate of interest, produces an upward
tilt to the breadwinner's consumption pro¯le. Simply put, an increase in market
unfairness increases precautionary saving.
To see the signi¯cance of the loading factor e®ect on precautionary saving,
we assume ut (x)=u(x)=x1¡®=(1 ¡ ®);®>0. Then the consumption pro¯le





[r ¡ ½ +( `t ¡ 1)pt] > 0;
is the growth rate of consumption. In contrast, Rt =( r ¡ ½)=® in Tobin's model
(`t = 1). The additional growth rate, (`t ¡ 1)pt=®, which rises with the loading
factor `t and the mortality rate pt; is thus attributed to the unfairness of the in-
surance market and the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty. From the table 6-1 of
CDC's Life Tables (of Vital Statistics of the United States, 1992, Vol. II, section
6), we obtain
10Table 1. Conditional probability of death
age 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60-65 65-70 70-75
pt . 8 % 1 . 0 %1 . 3 %1 . 8 %2 . 8 %4 . 4 %6 . 8 %1 0 . 1 % 1 4 . 7 %
An immediate inference to be drawn from Table 1 is this: Since the loading factor
and the mortality rate rises with the breadwinner's age, so does the growth rate
of consumption. Notice that this result is true when the dependents are young.
As an illustration, if we employ Lewis's point estimate, ` =2 ; then the addi-
tional growth rate of consumption is pt=®: If we employ Szpiro's (1986) estimates
that ® is between 1:2a n d1 :8, then pt=® lies between :7% and 1:1% for the bread-
winner who is 40-45, 1% and 1:5% for the breadwinner who is 45-50, and 1:6%
and 2:3% for the breadwinner who is 50-55. In practice, the additional rate of
growth of consumption (`t ¡ 1)pt=® should exceed the range of :7% to 2:3%; since
the loading factor rises with the breadwinner's age.
Similarly, the theory predicts that income transfer would rise with age if





¸ 1f o ra l lt · T. In his well-known study, par-
ticularly his Table 3, Espenshade (1984) shows that as children age (up to age 18)
they tend to become more expensive. Older children cost more because, among
others, they are physically larger and have more activities. Our model does not
take into account any of these factors. Rather, the result is implied by the bread-
winner's lifetime uncertainty and the unfairness of the insurance market. In other
w o r d s ,o u rr e s u l tp r o v i d e sa nadditional reason for Espenshade's ¯ndings. The
inclusion of college expenditures would only strengthen, not weaken, the result.4
4In empirical studies, high school students are generally treated as dependents, but not
necessarily college students. Whether or not college expenses should be considered as transfers,
the reader is referred to Gale and Scholz (1994) for an interesting discussion.
11The theory also predicts that income transfer would be further delayed if the
loading factor increases.
4. Contingent Bequest
The implication on the bequest-age relation, however, is di®erent. As mentioned
earlier, a departure of the paper from Fischer's model is that we speci¯cally assume
that the breadwinner leaves the bequest with a clear purpose of helping the child
reach independence and that the bene¯ciary will use the bequest optimally. To
make it tractable, we ignore the fact that the bene¯ciary may want to save some of
this bequest for the use beyond age T.W ea l s oa s s u m et h eb e n e ¯ c i a r y ' ss u bj e c t i v e
discount rate equals the market interest rate, i.e., assume the discount factor is
(1 + r)
¡1 : Then










t¡j xj = wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft:
It is easy to verify that, with r =0 ,
Bt [wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft]=( T ¡ t +1 )v
Ã
wt +( 1¡ `tpt)ft
T ¡ t +1
!
: (4.2)







T ¡ t +1
¶
:
If the marginal utility of bequest rises with age, then
8s<t ;
xs
T ¡ s +1
>
xt
T ¡ t +1
) xs >
µT ¡ s +1
T ¡ t +1
¶
xt >x t;
12i.e., contingent bequest falls with time. Next, assume the age pro¯le of the mar-
ginal utility of bequest is downward sloping. Since T ¡ s +1>T¡ t +1a n d
xs
T¡s+1 < xt
T¡t+1;8s<t ;we cannot conclude that xs <x t. In fact, the opposite
could happen, i.e., contingent bequest falls with time, if the rate of decline in
the marginal utilities of bequest is fairly small. This is quite possible because `t,
pt, and hence
`t(1¡pt)











t (gt ¡ `tptft)
o
. The intuition behind this result is that
the bene¯ciary's need for protection declines as the child grows up, which makes
a declining age pro¯le of bequest possible. This bequest-age relation is germane
to Pissarides's (1980) ¯nding (his b3 curve).
To complete the argument for r>0; we assume that the utility function is of
the form v (x)=x1¡¸=(1 ¡ ¸);¸>0: Then the bequest function can be written
as
Bt (x)=b(t;T)

















By de¯nition, b(t;T)i sincreasing in T ¡ t + 1. Clearly, the aforementioned
argument applies and the bequest could fall as the bene¯ciary grows up.
In reality, the bene¯ciaries are minors and therefore do not receive direct
bequests. Often the funds are placed in the hands of the surviving parents, legal
guardian or placed in trust for children until they reach adulthood. It seems
reasonable to assume that whoever is in charge would have the bene¯ciary's best
interest in mind and that the bene¯ciary's utility up to the age of independence
is maximized, as the decedent would have wished.
135. Birth Order E®ect
When there are two or more children, the model becomes quite complicated within
the framework of the expected utility maximization, because there are issues aris-
ing from infertility, child mortality and time inconsistency. To make the model
tractable and to make the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty the only source of
uncertainty, we shall make some simplifying assumptions. Speci¯cally, we assume
away child mortality so that all dependents will reach independence with cer-
tainty, and assume perfect family planning such that the number of children and
their age di®erentials are nonstochastic and exogenously given.
For the purpose of exposition, the model is set for two dependents. The ¯rst
period represents the year the ¯rst child is born. This child reaches independence
at T1 = T.T h es e c o n dc h i l dw i l lb eb o r ni np e r i o dt2 · T1 and reaches indepen-
dence at age T2 = T + t2 ¡ 1: The division of assets at the breadwinner's death
is denoted by »i
t; the percentage of assets given to bene¯ciary i; with »1
t +»2
t =1 :




Then the breadwinner's problem, for t · T2,i s


































t =0 ,a n df o r
T1 <t· T2, g1
t = f1
t = v1
t = 0. Naturally, for t>T 2, the problem is simpli¯ed to
















The total transfer is gt = g1
t + g2
t; while the total purchase of life insurance is
ft = f1
t + f2
t : The law of motion is still (2:1):
14For t2 · t · T1; assume vi
t (x)=vi (x)=x1¡¸i=(1 ¡ ¸i);¸ i > 0, i =1 ;2: By
(4:3), Bi
t (x)=b(t;Ti)














































The expenditure on each child is governed by (5:2): Under the usual condi-
tions, the expenditure rises with age. An interesting implication is this: Given
the initial wealth and earning pro¯le fytg; an increase in the number of children
lowers each consumption pro¯le, including the breadwinner's. Moreover, the ag-
gregate expenditure on children tends to peak just before the oldest child reaches
independence. These results reinforce Espenshade's (1984) ¯ndings that the num-
ber of children has a greater impact on parental expenditures than the parents'
socioeconomic status and wife's employment status. Equation (5:3) says that the
contingent bequest for child i is positively related to gi
t ¡ `tptfi
t (the standard of
living if the breadwinner survives), b(t;Ti)( t h et i m ei tt a k e sc h i l di to reach inde-
pendence), and ¸i (the taste parameter), but negatively related to `t (the loading
factor). Equation (5:4) re°ects the optimal division of wealth (»i
t)s u c ht h a tt h e
marginal utilities of bequest are equal for all children.
To highlight the birth order e®ect, we assume the bene¯ciaries have identical
tastes, i.e., ¸1 = ¸2. Then both bene¯ciaries would receive the same amount of
income transfer while the breadwinner is alive. However, it is not so for contingent
15bequests. More precisely, from (5:4) and b(t;T1) <b(t;T2); the bequest to the
older child is smaller than the bequest to the younger child5,i . e . ,
»
1




twt +( 1¡ `tpt)f
2
t : (5.5)
The intuition is that each child would receive \equal protection" from the bread-
winner up to the age of independence. The older child, who has been protected for
some time, clearly needs less protection than the younger sibling. An immediate
corollary is that the breadwinner will leave a larger bequest to the handicapped
children than to those who are not handicapped, since it takes a handicapped
child a longer time to reach independence.
The theory remains valid for T1 · t · T2 if B1
t (x)=v1 (x)=v (x). In this









Since b(t;T2) > 1; we have »2
twt +( 1¡ `tpt)f>» 1
twt: Once again, the younger
child would receive a larger bequest. For t>T 2, equal division (»1
t = »2
t)i st h e
rule if Bi
t (x)=v(x);i=1 ;2.
This birth order result may appear contradictory to the theory of primogen-
iture and many empirical ¯ndings. But, it is not. On the theoretic front, Chu
(1991) shows that in the pursuit for lineal succession, when dependents' lifetimes
are uncertain, the older child would receive a larger bequest. Since we assume away
the issue of child mortality, our result is not at odds with his theory. On empirical
5In practice, the designated bene¯ciary of the life insurance may be the spouse. Not only it
blurs the distinction of di®erential bequest discussed above, but also it ushers in the principal-
agent problem of resource allocation. No attempt is made to deal with these issues in this
paper.
16front, most ¯ndings of primogeniture are based on the bequests to adult bene-
¯ciaries, while our theory applies to the very young and ¯nancially constrained
children.
6. Demand for Life Insurance
The demand for life insurance, fi
t; is jointly determined with consumption ct
and income transfer gi
t. Consequently, the comparative statics should be jointly
determined as well. To facilitate the analysis, we follow Lewis's approximation
method of setting pt ¼ 0. This can be justi¯ed from Table 1, since the conditional
probability of death is generally below 2% for ages 50 and younger, the time to
raise a family. Then
`t(1¡pt)


























The aggregate demand for life insurance thus obtained is negatively related to
loading factor `t and savings wt, but positively related to risk aversion ¸: These
are fairly standard results.
An interesting implication of equation (6:1) is that the aggregate demand for
life insurance rises with b(t;T1)g1
t +b(t;T2)g2
t. It shows that the demand for life
insurance depends on the number, the age di®erentials, the time it takes for each
child to reach independence, and the consumption need of the bene¯ciaries. In
short, the demand for life insurance thus obtained re°ects the \needs" and the
17\circumstances" of the bene¯ciaries. It should be mentioned that equation (6:1)
a generalization of Lewis' equation (11)















Recall that ¸ is between 1:2a n d1 :8: If we employ Lewis's ¯nding that wt=ft
averages 2:4; then the elasticity is between 1:8a n d2 :8. This elastic demand
for life insurance has an interesting economic interpretation. In the absence of
market insurance, the breadwinner's saving (wt) has the e®ect of reducing the
bene¯ciary's losses in the event of the breadwinner's death. Consequently, it is
af o r mo fself-insurance of Ehrlich and Becker (1972) even though it lags by one
period and the buyer (the breadwinner) is di®erent from the bene¯ciary. From
this perspective, an elastic demand for life insurance suggests that there is a strong
substitution e®ect between self-insurance and market insurance.
7. Conclusion and Comparisons to Lewis (1989)
In this paper we presented a theory of life insurance purchase of an altruistic
breadwinner supporting his liquidity constrained children. The model takes the
ages and the consumption need of the dependent children explicitly into account.
It di®ers from Fischer's (1975) model in that the choice between the breadwinner's
own consumption and that of the bene¯ciary is endogenous, there are gifts inter
vivos, and that the purchase of life insurance depends on the number and the
circumstances of the dependent children.
Lewis had the same objective. However, there are major di®erences. Lewis
assumes that the breadwinner's own consumption and the gifts to the heirs are
18exogenously given. In contrast, our model allows the dependent's utility function
to enter the breadwinner's optimization problem. In our dynamic setting, the
breadwinner's consumption, gifts inter vivos, life insurance purchase, and con-
tingent bequests are jointly determined in a single model. As a result, several
interesting economic implications that go beyond Lewis' ¯ndings emerge.
First, our theory provides some new insights into the life cycle theory. We show
that the breadwinner's own lifetime uncertainty and the altruism toward heirs are
incentives for precautionary saving. Speci¯cally, we show that the consumption
pro¯le is steeper than the one derived from the standard life-cycle model because
the growth rate of consumption depends positively on the breadwinner's mortality
rate and the unfairness of the insurance market. It may account for some of the
observed delayed consumption than previously recognized.
Second, our theory sheds some lights on the role of the dependents' ages in
the breadwinner's decision making. As the child ages, the need for protection
is reduced, and hence, the time path of bequest to each child may decline with
the child's age. When there are several children, the younger child have a larger
bequest because the older child need less protection { a result opposite of primo-
geniture. We also show that the gifts inter vivos grow with each child's age as
a result of the breadwinner's lifetime uncertainty, thereby provides an additional
reason for this empirical fact. In addition, the demand for life insurance depends
on the ages of children as shown in (6:1).
Third, we show that the number of children matters in a variety of ways. As
the number of children increase, there is an additional saving to meet the future
need. The age pro¯le of consumption of the breadwinner is lowered as the number
19of children increases, if the breadwinner's earning pro¯le remains unchanged. The
same is true for income transfer and bequest. Furthermore, the age pro¯le of gifts
inter vivos for each child rises with age, and the aggregate transfer peaks just right
before the oldest child reaches the age of independence. Moreover, the demand
for life insurance clearly re°ects the number and the needs of the bene¯ciaries.
I ts h o u l db em e n t i o n e dt h a tw eh a v em a d es o m es i m p l i f y i n ga s s u m p t i o n st o
make the model tractable. Speci¯cally, we assume perfect family planning on the
timing and age di®erentials of children, and assume away child mortality so that
all dependents will live to their respective ages of independence. We also minimize
the role played by the surviving spouse in the purchase of life insurance. Relaxing
these assumptions would test the robustness of the theory developed in this paper.
For example, it would be interesting to compare this theory of contingent bequest
to Chu's theory of primogeniture in the presence of child mortality. These are for
future research.
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